Near-Term Prospects for a Lebanon-Israel Peace Treaty
By Don Sutherland

On Sunday, August 20, 2006, Lebanon’s Prime Minister Fouad Siniora suggested that Israel, if it ‘behaves wisely,’ could be in a position to enter into a peace treaty with Lebanon. Don’t schedule the celebrations just yet. Throughout the course of its long history, the Middle East has been a graveyard for optimism. There, the promise of peace has typically proved more illusory than a desert mirage. Therefore, the offer needs to be tested to determine if it is credible. Even if it is, major obstacles could still block the way to peace between Lebanon and Israel.

Prime Minister Siniora’s willingness to pursue peace with Israel could be ascertained by determining whether he is willing to engage in direct and unconditional negotiations with Israel aimed at reaching a bilateral peace treaty. Israel should test the Prime Minister’s commitment to peace by inviting him to Jerusalem for such talks. Afterward, rhetoric would have to give way to diplomacy.

If the Lebanese Prime Minister is serious about peace, the path to peace between Israel and Lebanon is relatively uncomplicated in terms of the substance involved. An agreement would declare that the historic conflict between Israel and Lebanon is “finally terminated,” provide for full diplomatic relations between the two countries, resolve the status of the disputed Shebaa Farms area in creating a secure, recognized, and agreed border, provide for the disarming of Hezbollah and offer assurances that both parties would take responsibility to prevent attacks against the other from being launched from their soil, and would end any economic boycotts.

Nonetheless, uncomplicated as the path to peace might be, a host of obstacles would likely make the peace process perilous. A glimpse at those possible barriers is useful in assessing the near- or medium-term prospect for a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel.

The Historic Arab Narrative:

The historic Arab narrative that sees Israel as an “artificial” and “illegitimate” state could color attitudes against a bilateral peace agreement. The bias could be tilted severely toward a prolonged ceasefire that falls far short of peace and full diplomatic relations.